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Abstract 
Often in cooperative situations, many aspects of the decision-
making environment are uncertain. We investigate how 
cooperation is shaped by the way information about risk is 
presented (from description or from experience) and by 
differences in risky environments. Drawing on research from 
risky choice, we compare choices in stochastic social 
dilemmas to those in lotteries with equivalent levels of risk. 
Cooperation rates in games vary with different levels of risk 
across decision situations with the same expected outcomes, 
thereby mimicking behavior in lotteries. Risk presentation, 
however, only affected choices in lotteries, not in stochastic 
games. Process data suggests that people respond less to 
probabilities in the stochastic social dilemmas than in the 
lotteries. The findings highlight how an uncertain 
environment shapes cooperation and call for models of the 
underlying decision processes. 
Keywords: Decisions from Experience; Cooperation; Risky 
Choice; Public Good.  
Cooperation in Risky Environments 
When people face an opportunity to cooperate, such as 
when opening a business together or pursuing a joint 
research project, the outcomes of these enterprises are 
frequently uncertain. On the one hand, joint enterprises 
often constitute a social dilemma, where it is in the 
collective interest of the group to cooperate, yet individually 
rational to free ride. Despite these incentives, there is 
overwhelming evidence that many people still engage in 
cooperation (e.g., Ostrom, 1990). On the other hand, even if 
people cooperate outcomes often are uncertain due to a risky 
environment. For instance, even if all business partners 
cooperate, a new start-up may fail due to external events, 
such as natural disasters disrupting supplier shipments. 
Laboratory experiments show that when social dilemmas are 
embedded in a stochastic environment, cooperation declines 
sharply (for a review see E.Van Dijk et al., 2004). What has 
not been addressed is how different levels of environmental 
risk and the format in which it is presented affect 
cooperation.  
Studies on risky choice find a pronounced difference in 
behavior depending on how information in lotteries is 
presented: whether people sample the distribution of 
outcomes (decisions from experience) or decide based on a 
summary description of outcomes and probabilities 
(decision from description) (for a review see Rakow & 
Newell, 2010). In conventional lotteries with described 
probabilities, people choose as-if they overweight small 
probabilities as reflected in Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1992). In contrast, people decide as-if they 
underweight small probabilities if they acquire risk 
information sequentially by sampling (Hertwig et al., 2004). 
The difference in choice patterns between decisions from 
description and experience has been labeled the description-
experience gap (DE gap).  
In lotteries, outcomes depend on environmental risk 
alone, whereas outcomes in social dilemmas also depend on 
the choices of other individuals. Stochastic social dilemmas 
thus combine social uncertainty and environmental risk. Yet 
our understanding of cooperation in stochastic environments 
is currently limited to situations in which environmental risk 
is described by outcomes and probabilities (e.g., Bereby-
Meyer & Roth, 2006; Gong et al., 2009; Levati et al., 2009).  
We argue that real-world risky choices often involve 
experiencing the outcomes and probabilities of choices 
rather than receiving their summary statistics. Therefore, 
examining how risk presentation influences people’s 
decisions is critical to understand how and when people 
cooperate in risky environments.  
There is one important presupposition: risk presentation 
can influence cooperation only if people are responsive to 
differences in environmental risk. In lotteries, people’s 
decisions have been found to vary with different levels of 
risk, i.e. for different combinations of outcomes and 
probabilities while keeping the expected value constant. 
Analogously, one can describe a stochastic social dilemma 
by the expected payoffs of cooperation. In a one-shot 
prisoner's dilemma, people not only cooperate but also 
respond to different outcomes (Guyer & Rapoport, 1972). 
Extending this finding to a stochastic setting, the second 
goal of this study is to establish whether and how different 
levels of risk affect behavior in one-shot social dilemmas 
with the same expected payoffs. 
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Like other types of choices, cooperation is a function of 
the match between decision processes and the decision-
making environment, or what has been labeled ecological 
rationality. Besides social uncertainty, which has been 
studied extensively, the levels of environmental risk and 
uncertainty are critical components of real-world 
environments that researchers are only recently beginning to 
appreciate. For instance, cooperation unravels slower in a 
stochastic social dilemma than in a deterministic one 
(Bereby-Meyer & Roth, 2006), and groups cooperate more 
than individuals (Gong et al., 2009). None of the studies, 
however, addresses how differences in risky environments 
and the way risk is presented affects cooperation.  
Experiment 
The goal of the study is to investigate how risk presentation 
and different levels of environmental risk affect cooperation 
in a social dilemma. Even if the outcomes of cooperation 
also depend on the action of others, the environmental risk 
affects all who cooperate equally. We thus expect both 
aspects to influence cooperation in risky environments in 
the same way as lottery choices with environmental risk 
alone.  To facilitate understanding, we present the detailed 
hypotheses (see below) after the implementation. 
We used a 2 x 2 between-subjects design in which we 
manipulated risk presentation (description vs. experience) 
and choice situation (social dilemma vs. lottery). In the 
description condition, subjects received information about 
how environmental risk influenced outcomes in a social 
dilemma as a probability statement, whereas in the 
experience condition participants sampled to infer the 
probabilities. To control whether the values and 
probabilities chosen to implement environmental risk 
replicated the DE gap, two further groups made decisions in 
lotteries, again either from description or experience. The 
environmental risk was identical between lotteries and 
games. To investigate how different levels of risk affect 
behavior in one-shot social dilemmas, we varied 
probabilities and outcomes within-subjects while keeping 
the expected outcomes constant.  
Methods 
Environmental Risk in Social Dilemmas and Lotteries 
For the social dilemma conditions, we used a stochastic 2-
person public goods game (PG) with binary choices.  For 
each choice, participants receive an endowment e (10€) 
which they could contribute to a joint project with a 
randomly matched partner or keep for themselves. 
Contributions were multiplied by a value (msr) and shared 
equally between both pair members. Denoting i’s 
contribution by ci, where ci ∈ {0, e} and i = 1, 2, i’s payoff 
is given by  
 
 
We impose msr ∈{1, 2}. An msr > 1 made it socially 
optimal to contribute, whereas an msr < 2 rendered free-
riding the dominant strategy for a selfish person, thus 
creating a social dilemma.  
We manipulated environmental risk by assigning the msr 
to one of two possible values, representing either a good or 
a bad event, with a certain probability. In case the bad event 
occured (with probability p), contributions were multiplied 
by an msr < 1, decreasing the value of the public good. 
When the good event occured, contributions were multiplied 
by an msr > 1, increasing the value of the contributions. The 
environmental risk only affected what was invested. 
Cooperation thus represents the risky and non-cooperation 
the sure option. We chose the two potential msr-values and 
corresponding probabilities such that the expected msr, 
E[msr], across good and bad event always yielded a social 
dilemma with 1 < E[msr] < 2.  
Table 1 illustrates the eight decision situations employed. 
Situations 1 to 4 contained rare (p < 0.25) bad events, 
analogous to the DE gap studies with lotteries (e.g., Hertwig 
et al., 2004). Situations 5 and 6 contained more common (p 
> 0.25) bad events to test whether the DE gap extends 
beyond rare events as found by Ludvig and Spetch (2011). 
We use two different expected msr, 1.2 and 1.4, to check the 
robustness of the results. Situations 1 – 6 were designed to 
extend the findings from the DE gap studies in risky choice 
to social dilemmas. At the same time, keeping the expected 
msr constant across different combinations of probabilities 
and potential returns allows us to test whether different 
levels of environmental risk affect choices in the PG in the 
same way in which they affect choices in lotteries.  
Decision situation 7 and 8 explored boundary conditions 
of a social dilemma and provided a further control of 
participants’ understanding of the incentives. In situation 7, 
the E[msr] equaled 1.1, which made it less attractive to 
cooperate compared to situations 1 – 6. In contrast to the 
other situations, here the rare event was the good state of the 
world. Different from situations 1 to 7, the expected msr of 
2.1 in situation 8 did not generate a social dilemma and 
made it individually and socially optimal to cooperate.  
In most studies on the DE gap, the risky option has an 
expected value that is only marginally higher than the sure 
option. To avoid floor effects in the social dilemma, we 
used relatively large expected msr. This should provide 
strong incentives to cooperate in the PG but results in a 
larger difference between the expected msr-value of the sure 
option and risky option. To control whether the parameters 
we chose for implementing environmental risk replicated 
the DE gap in more standard settings, we ran the same 
choices as lotteries with identical environmental risks. In the 
lottery conditions, participants also received an endowment 
e and had to decide whether to invest into a risky option. 
The risky option in each lottery used the same two possible 
msr with the same probabilities as the corresponding PG. 
Yet, while the payoffs in the games also depended on the 
action of another person, the payoffs in the lotteries only 
depended on the realized state of the world. The lotteries 
strip the strategic component away but retain the stochastic 
component that stems from the environment. We 
).c+c(
2
msr
+c-e= 21iiπ (1) 
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randomized the order of decision situations in games as well 
as lotteries, and participants received no feedback about the 
realized msr (or decision of the other group member) after 
each decision.  
 
Decisions from Description vs. Decision from Experience 
In the description conditions, participants received 
information about environmental risk as a summary 
statement about probabilities and associated mrs-values 
before they made their decision. In the experience 
conditions, participants sampled the distribution of 
mrs-values by drawing 25 cards from a deck. We used a 
matched-sampling design based on Ungemach et al. (2010), 
where people were forced to view a representative sample of 
the underlying distributions of outcomes. Each card 
contained a number corresponding to one of the two 
possible msr. For example, in situation 1 the deck had 2 
cards with the msr 0 and 23 cards with the msr 1.30. The 
sequence of cards was randomized for each participant, yet 
the two possible msr and their frequencies matched exactly 
the objective probabilities given in the description 
condition. Thus, sampling error could not cause any 
differences observed between the two conditions.  
In the experience conditions, we additionally collected 
time stamps that allowed us to evaluate how long 
participants viewed a certain card and whether this 
influenced their decision. To check the accuracy of risk 
estimates, we also asked participants after the last round 
how often they saw the two sampled msr-values. In the 
description conditions, participants translated the 
probability statement of the last round into a frequency 
statement to control whether participants accurately 
understood the risk. 
 
Further Tasks In the social dilemma conditions, 
participants also faced two deterministic PGs with an msr of 
1.2 and 1.4 (randomized order) after the stochastic 
situations. This allowed us to investigate how cooperation 
varies if the stochastic component is removed, since the 
deterministic games matched the expected msr of the 
stochastic PGs in situations 1, 2, and 5 (E[mrs] = 1.2) as 
well as 3, 4, and 6 (E[mrs] = 1.4). 
At the end of the experimental session, participants 
indicated in a questionnaire which of six reasons best 
explains their decision to invest/not invest into the 
stochastic PGs: the probability of the mrs were (not) 
sufficiently high, the values of the mrs were (not) 
sufficiently high, conditional cooperation, social 
uncertainty, greed/opportunism, moral values, or none of 
these. A section on demographics concluded the experiment.  
 
Participants and Procedure We randomly assigned 128 
students in Jena, Germany, to one of four sessions. In the 
social dilemma conditions, participants had to pass control 
questions to ensure that they understood the impact of 
environmental risk and of the other person’s choice on their 
payoffs. All tasks were completed anonymously employing 
a perfect stranger design. At the end, one decision situation 
was randomly chosen to determine the payoff.  Participants 
earned on average 14€.  
Hypotheses 
Risk sensitivity in social dilemmas and lotteries Do 
different levels of environmental risk affect stochastic PGs 
in a similar way as they affect lotteries? To test this 
presupposition, we focus on decisions from description and 
employ the predictions of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1992). Using a separate value and weighting 
function, Prospect Theory transforms the expected outcomes 
of a lottery into Prospect Theory Values (PTVs), analogous 
to expected values. When comparing the PTV of a lottery’s 
risky option with a sure option (always 1 in our case), the 
conventional prediction is that the risky (sure) option is 
picked if the PTV is larger (smaller). Investment rates into 
the PG are expected to be lower than in lotteries due to a 
second source of uncertainty that stems from the other 
person.  Thus, the PTVs based on environmental risk alone 
are unlikely to be useful. However, the PTVs also produce a 
ranking of the 8 decision situations in terms of proportion of 
risky choices. Such a ranking can be applied to both lotteries 
and stochastic PGs in the description condition. Table 1 lists 
the PTVs for the eight decision situations of this experiment 
based on the parameters used by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). From the PTVs, two predictions follow for PGs and 
lotteries with the same expected msr:  
(1a) Situations 1 and 3 (bad event occurs with 8%) will lead 
to a higher number of risky choices than situations 2 and 4 
(where the bad event occurs with 20%).  
(1b) Situation 5 (6), where the bad event is more common, 
will lead to more risky choices than situations 1 and 2 (3 
and 4).  
 
Decisions from Description and from Experience Using 
lotteries, studies found that experienced small probabilities 
appear to be underweighted in choices compared to 
described ones (Hertwig et al., 2004). Extending this choice 
pattern to social dilemmas leads to the following hypothesis 
for stochastic PGs and lotteries:  
(2) The risky option will be chosen more frequently in the 
experience condition than in the description condition if the 
bad event is less likely (situations 1 – 6 and 8), whereas this 
pattern should reverse for situation 7, in which the good 
event is less likely. 
Results 
Risk Sensitivity in Social Dilemmas and Lotteries  
We would not expect risk presentation to matter unless 
people are sensitive to different levels of risk in games as 
they are in lotteries. For the results of hypothesis 1a and 1b, 
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Table 1: Percentage of subjects investing in PGs / lotteries and differences between description and experience conditions 
 
 
we focus on data from the description conditions for 
decision situations 1 to 6.  
When comparing decision situations with an E[msr] = 1.2 
and E[msr] = 1.4, cooperation increases with the expected 
msr. The deterministic PGs yield a similar pattern: the rate 
of cooperation is 53% when msr = 1.2 and, 81% when msr = 
1.4 (χ2(1) = 5.74, p = 0.02).  In the stochastic PGs, the 
average rate of cooperation is 33% when E[msr] = 1.2 and 
48% when E[msr] = 1.4 (χ2(1) = 4.23, p = 0.04). Thus, 
differences in expected msr affect behavior even though the 
social dilemma is maintained and the dominant strategy for 
a person is not to cooperate. This replicates Guyer & 
Rapoport (1972) findings and extends it to a stochastic 
setting. But, besides being sensitive to different expected 
outcomes, do people react to different levels of risk for 
constant expected outcomes?  
To address this question, we pool our data across 
situations with expected msr-values of 1.2 and 1.4 to obtain 
more reliable results. The mean cooperation rate is 1.7 times 
higher in situations where the bad event occurs with 8% 
than in situations where the bad event is common (χ2(1) = 
7.12, p = 0.01). Thus, changes in the stochastic environment 
have a large impact on cooperation. The difference in 
cooperation between deterministic and stochastic PG with 
an 8% chance of a bad event is only 10.5% and not 
significant (χ2(1) = 1.62, p = 0.20). 
To investigate hypotheses 1a and 1b – that situations with 
8% receive more investment than situations with 20% –, one 
can also rely on the pooled data across the E[msr] of 1.2 and 
1.4 because the rankings of PTVs are identical for both. The 
rate of investment in situations with a probability of 8% 
compared to 20% sharply drops both for stochastic PGs 
(from 56% to 33%, χ2(1) = 7.17, p = 0.01) and lotteries 
(from 80% to 53%, χ2(1) = 10.12, p < 0.001). Paralleling 
each other, stochastic PGs and lotteries thus are in line with 
prediction 1a based on Prospect Theory. 
For prediction 1b, the data also suggests a decline in 
cooperation between situations with a probability of 20% 
and those with two common events. Statistically, however, 
there is no difference between these two situations, neither 
for the stochastic PGs (the investment rate is constant at 
33%, χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.00), nor for lotteries (the 
investment rate declines from 53% to 39%, χ2(1) = 2.55, p = 
0.11). Hypothesis 1b based on Prospect Theory – that the 
rate of investment is highest with a common event – is 
neither met in stochastic PGs nor in lotteries.  
In summary, we find that different levels of 
environmental risk both influence choice in the PGs for 
Decision Situations Stochastic PG Lotteries 
# Risky Option E[msr] PTV Desc Exp 
Difference between 
description and experience 
conditions 
Desc Exp 
Difference between 
description and experience 
conditions 
One rare event  
1 1.30, 0.92 
    0, 0.08  
1.2 0.93 47 44 -3 (χ²(1) = 0.06, p = 0.80) 78 81 +3 (χ²(1) = 0.10, p = 0.76) 
2 1.45, 0.8 
0, 0.2 
1.2 0.84 28 28 0 (χ²(1) = 0.00, p = 1.00) 44 69 +25 (χ²(1) = 4.06, p = 0.04) 
3 1.55, 0.92 
0, 0.08 
1.4 1.09 66 56 -9 (χ²(1) = 0.59, p = 0.44) 81 88 +6 (χ²(1) = 0.47, p = 0.49) 
4 1.80, 0.8 
0, 0.2 
1.4 1.02 38 38 0 (χ²(1) = 0.00, p = 1.00) 63 78 +16 (χ²(1) = 1.87, p = 0.17) 
Mean 1 – 4   45 41 -3 (χ²(1) = 0.26, p = 0.61) 66 79 +13 (χ²(1) = 5.03, p = 0.03)
Two common events  
5 1.80, 0.64 
0.20, 0.36 
1.2 0.96 25 28 3 (χ²(1) = 0.08, p = 0.77) 34 44 +9 (χ²(1) = 0.59, p = 0.44) 
6 1.95, 0.56 
0.70, 0.44 
1.4 1.21 41 28 -13 (χ²(1) = 1.11, p = 0.29) 44 59 +16 (χ²(1) = 1.56, p = 0.21) 
Mean 5 & 6  33 28 -5 (χ²(1) = 0.33, p = 0.57) 39 52 +13 (χ²(1) = 2.02, p = 0.16)
Extreme msr  
7 0.75, 0.88 
3.50, 0.12 
1.1 1.23 19 16 -3 (χ²(1) = 0.11, p = 0.74) 38 16 -22  (χ²(1) = 3.92, p = 0.05) 
8 2.20, 0.96 
0.30, 0.04 
2.1 1.70 91 88 -3 (χ²(1) = 0.16, p = 0.69) 100 97 -3 (p = 0.50, Fisher's exact  
                                  test) 
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decisions from description and result in similar behavior in 
stochastic PGs and lotteries. Though the data confirm the 
predictions of Prospect Theory for hypothesis 1a, we did not 
obtain support for hypothesis 1b for either PGs or lotteries.   
Decisions from Description and from Experience 
Is there a DE gap in lotteries and games? We initially 
focus on pooled data from the eight decision situations to 
start with more reliable results. Hypothesis 2 is directional 
and states that, except for situation 7, participants should 
choose the risky option more often in the experience 
condition. To test this hypothesis, we subtracted the 
percentage of people contributing in the experience 
condition from those in the description condition, except for 
situation 7 where we do the opposite. The results show a 
positive gap for lotteries (χ2 (1) = 8.24, p = 0.003), with a 
mean difference between experience and description of 12% 
(SD = 10%).  
Table 1 lists percentage of people investing in experience 
and description separately for all eight decisions situations 
in lotteries and stochastic PGs. For lotteries, the predicted 
difference between the experience and description condition 
is observed in all situations (including the reversal for 
situation 7) – except for lottery 8. This lottery shows a 
ceiling effect because the expected outcome is twice as high 
as the sure option, so that in both conditions all participants 
but one invested. 
Averaging across lotteries 1-4, which contain a rare event, 
shows a DE gap of 13% (Table 1). The same DE gap (13%) 
occurs with lotteries containing a more common bad event 
(5 and 6, Table 1). The results replicate Ludvig and Spetch 
(2011), who find the DE gap also for situations with 
common events. Overall, responses to decisions from 
description and experience differed in lotteries as predicted 
based on previous findings. Thus, the parameters we chose 
for environmental risk replicate the DE gap found in the 
risky choice literature.  
Given that the parameters replicate the DE gap in lotteries 
and the previous result that people’s decisions in games 
were similarly sensitive to differences in risk as in lotteries, 
we expected the risk presentation format to influence 
cooperation as well. The behavior in the stochastic PGs, 
however, does in this respect not match the behavior in 
lotteries: the DE gap completely disappears in games (χ2(1) 
= 0.38, p = 0.30). The mean difference between experience 
and description in the stochastic PG is -3% (SD = 6%). 
The stochastic PGs stand in stark contrast to the results in 
the lotteries. In games, 6 out of 8 decision situations show 
no or only minimal gaps. Experience and description 
conditions do not differ for any of the decision situations. In 
fact, situation 7, which is closest in spirit to the situations 
used in by Hertwig et al., (2004) and Ungemach et al., 
(2009), shows a strong DE gap in lotteries, but the gap 
disappears completely in the games. 
 
Why is there a DE gap in lotteries but not in games? In 
the following, we explore reasoning processes in PGs and 
lotteries that provide hints to why risk presentation affects 
lotteries but not stochastic PGs.  
One possible explanation underlying this pattern is that 
participants spend different amounts of time sampling in 
lotteries and games, which may indicate different search 
processes. In lotteries, participants spent more time viewing 
the rare event (M = 0.91 seconds, SD = 0.99) compared to 
the frequent event (M = 0.67 seconds, SD = 0.65, t(6400) = 
10.01, p < 0.001). Similarly, for the games, participants 
viewed the rare event (M = 0.51 seconds, SD = 0.51) longer 
than the frequent event (M = 0.43 seconds, SD = 0.33, 
t(6400) = 6.38, p < 0.001). In lotteries, however, 
participants spent more time sampling than in games for 
both rare events (t(2432) = 12.45, p < 0.001) and frequent 
events (t(10368) = 24.02, p < 0.001). These differences in 
sampling times thus provide evidence for potentially 
different search processes in games which appear to pay less 
attention to the actually observed probabilities compared to 
lotteries. 
To control for the accuracy of risk perception, participants 
in the experience conditions stated the frequency of the two 
outcomes in the last situation after they had decided. The 
actual distribution of outcomes participants saw correlates 
with the stated frequencies for lotteries (rS = 0.72, p < 
0.001) yet to a lesser extent for stochastic PGs (rS = 0.43, p 
< 0.01). In both conditions participants were calibrated to 
the actual probabilities and did not underestimate but rather, 
if anything, overestimated the probability of rare events.   
Some researchers suggest that the larger influence of 
recent events in decisions from experience may drive the 
DE gap. Hertwig et al. (2004) and Rakow, Demes, & 
Newell (2008) found a recency effect in decisions from 
experience but Ungemach et al., (2010) and Hau, Pleskac, 
Kiefer, & Hertwig (2008) did not. To test for a recency 
effect, we divided the 25 samples participants draw before 
each decision into two sets: from 1 to 12 (initial) and from 
13 to 25 (latter). Then we computed the expected msr from 
the initial samples, E[msr]1-12, and from the latter samples, 
E[msr]13-25. Finally, we compare the number of risky 
choices made when E[msr]13-25 > E[msr]1-12 to the number 
of risky choices made when E[msr]13-25 < E[msr]1-12. When 
the E[msr] of the latter, more recent sample was larger, we 
find a higher number of risky choices in lotteries (χ2(1) = 
3.77, p = 0.04) but not in games (χ2(1) = 0.30, p = 0.34). 
This also suggests that the actual observed probabilities may 
play a less important role in games than in lotteries.  
Finally, for the stochastic PG in description and 
experience, participants indicated their most important 
reasons for cooperating as well as not cooperating. This 
resulted in two statements per participants. Aggregating 
across both statements, probabilities influenced cooperation 
decisions in the description condition for 59% of the 
participants, compared to 39% in the experience condition. 
In this condition, participants rather emphasized both the 
value of the msr they could obtain (20% in experience, and 
3% in description) and their expectation whether the other 
will (not) cooperate, i.e. conditional cooperation (20% in 
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experience and 11% in description). This indicates that the 
importance of the probabilities for decisions is further 
reduced in the stochastic PG in experience.  
In summary, participants sampled more quickly in the 
stochastic PG in the experience condition than in lotteries, 
as if they were paying less attention to the observed 
probabilities. In line with this, subjects’ risk perception was 
less accurate in games than in lotteries, and recency – a 
potential cause of the DE gap – did not play a role in games, 
whereas we did find a recency effect in lotteries. The 
questionnaire also highlighted that probabilities were less 
important in the PG in experience than the size of the values 
and beliefs about others’ behavior. This provides 
converging evidence that as the probabilities of the risky 
option lose importance in the games, the DE gap washes 
out.  
General Discussion 
People often cooperate in social dilemmas. We examined 
how critical aspects of the stochastic environment shape 
cooperation. First, different levels of environmental risk 
influence cooperation. Investments in the stochastic PGs 
match those observed in lotteries, with people preferring an 
8% chance of a bad event to a 20% chance for constant 
expected payoffs. Second, the msr-values and probabilities 
chosen to implement environmental risk replicate the DE 
gap within individual risky choices in lotteries. That is, 
people choose the risky option more often when 
experiencing the risky outcomes compared to when 
receiving summary descriptions. Our key finding is that, 
nevertheless, risk presentation matters in lotteries but not in 
games: no DE gap existed for the social dilemmas. Process 
data and subjects self-reported reasons for cooperation 
suggest that the disappearance of the DE gap in games may 
result from a decision process that emphasizes the size of 
the outcomes and expectations about others' behavior over 
outcome probabilities.  
In our view, to include environmental risk and decisions 
from experience into the study of cooperation invites more 
realism into the laboratory. This study is only a small step to 
build on insights from research on risky choice for decision 
situations which combine environmental risk and social 
uncertainty. In particular, models that focus more on actual 
decision processes instead of choices alone may provide 
promising alternative starting points to Prospect Theory, 
which in our study could not account for the data in the 
description condition for either lotteries or games. In 
complex interactive environments, it seems rather likely that 
non-compensatory decision making emerges. For instance, a 
lexicographic strategy like the Priority Heuristic 
(Brandstatter et al. 2006), outlines a sequential decision 
process which considers outcomes in the first and 
probabilities only as a second step if no decisions has been 
made. In a similar fashion, other strategies that do not trade-
off reasons may be valuable to model search and decisions 
processes in situations that combine environmental risk and 
social uncertainty – and thus also include expectations about 
others and further social reasons besides mere outcomes and 
probabilities.  
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